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STATUS OF OLDER WORKERS:
EVIDENCE FROM SELF-REPORTS
ABSTRACT
This paper explores the prevalence and consequences of age discrimination in the
workplace by analyzing self-reports of discrimination by respondents in the National Longitudinal
Survey of Older Men. Age discrimination was reported in seven percent of our cases, during the
period 1966-1980. Workers with positive reports were much more likely to separate from their
employer and less likely to remain employed than workers who report no age discrimination.
The estimated effect of reported discrimination remains large and significant even when
controlling for the existence of mandatory retirement provisions on the current job. These
findings are generally robust to numerous attempts to correct the estimates for the inherent
limitations of self-reported data, particularly the potential heterogeneity bias that arises from
differences in the propensity to report discrimination, and the possibility that discrimination is
reported in response to other negative labor market outcomes.
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and NBERI. Introduction
Anecdotal evidence abounds of older workers who have experienced discrimination
because of their age. The popular press is replete with stories of individual employees who have
been replaced by younger workers, sometimes just before they become eligible for lucrative
retirement benefits. Some older workers (in the past) were forced by mandatory retirement
provisions to leave their job before they would otherwise have chosen to retire. Others who remain
on the job claim that they confront hostile work environments or are demoted to less remunerative
positions because of their age. Concern by policy makers over these types of incidents prompted
Congress to enact the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) in 1968, which outlawed
discrimination in the workplace against workers between the ages of 40 and 65. Later amendments
prohibited mandatory retirement before the age of 70 (in 1978) and then outlawed it completely
(with a few exceptions) in 1986. During 1990,10,485 complaints of age discrimination were filed
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, 1994).1
However, there is little empirical research to document the prevalence or impact of age
discrimination in the labor market. In fact, prima facie evidence of discrimination against older
workers is less compelling than that for other demographic groups (Friedman, 1984). With respect
to labor market indicators frequently studied as evidence of discrimination – income and
unemployment (e.g., Lloyd and Niemi, 1979) – older individuals tend if anything to fare better.
Older workers have relatively high labor market earnings, at least into their fifties (Bureau of Labor
Statistics, 1989), high non-labor income (Hurd, 1990), and low civilian unemployment rates.
In addition, many economists have questioned the virtue of legislation outlawing mandatory
lBy comparison, there were 43,532 complaints filed with the EEOC in 1990 under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, primarily for alleged discrimination based on sex or race.
-1-retirement provisions, which are critical components of long-term incentive contracts (Lazear,
1979). In order to elicit effort from workers, employers may initially pay wages below the value of
marginal product in exchange for implicit promises of future wages that exceed the value of
marginal product for workers who remain with the firm. Mandatory retirement ages then become
necessary to induce high-wage workers to leave the flrrn, Workers find it in their interest to enter
into these long-term employment relationships with mandatory retirement, but once they reach the
mandatory retirement age they would prefer to continue working at their current wage. By
eliminating shirking, however, long-term contracting (with mandatory retirement) in the Lazear
model is efficient, leading Lazear to argue that legislation to ban mandatory retirement contracts
enables current older workers to “enjoy a small once-and-for-all gain at the expense of a much
larger and continuing efficiency loss that affects all workers and firms adversely” (Lazear, 1979,
pp. 1283-84). Nonetheless, the ADEA may have a sound rationale if employers engage in
discriminatory practices against older workers. Thus, the ADEA cannot be fairly evaluated before
first assessing the prevalence and impact of age discrimination in the labor market, ideally relying
on data prior to the proliferation of age discrimination lawsuits.
The inherent difficulty in measuring age discrimination probably accounts for the lack of
attention devoted to it by economists. Many analyses of sex and race discrimination in the labor
market proceed from the assumption that women and members of racial minorities are as
productive as men and white workers, after controlling for other observable factors that are likely to
affect productivity. Differences in earnings that persist afier controlling for human capital and
other variables are then attributed to labor market discrimination. However, this approach is clearly
not appropriate for the analysis of age discrimination, since the very process of aging is likely to
affect worker productivity. On one hand, older workers have more experience, which generally
-2-increases productivity; on the other hand, skills may deteriorate with age afier a certain point,
reducing productivity.2 Regardless of which effect dominates, the assumption that older workers
are equally productive as younger workers – controlling for variables such as education,
experience, and tenure – is not compelling.
In this paper, we take a different approach to the analysis of age discrimination by
investigating self-reports of age discrimination. We assess the effects of age discrimination
comparing labor market outcomes for older workers who claim that they have experienced
by
discrimination on the job with outcomes for workers who do not report discrimination. Although
the use of self-reports can be problematic – primarily because individuals may differ systematically
in their propensity to report discrimination, and because such reports may reflect negative outcomes
that are, in fact, unrelated to discrimination – in the absence of actual measures of productivity,
self-reports may offer the best available indicators of age discrimination.3 We are also able to
mitigate many of the problems associated with self-reports by comparing an individual’s responses
at different points in time and by utilizing some of the rich information available in the data to
control for potentially confounding factors.
In contrast to investigating earnings, which is generally the outcome of interest in studies of
sex and race discrimination, this paper focuses on the effects of age discrimination on job
separations and spells of non-employment, both of which maybe precursors to fill or partial
‘For evidence of such productivity declines see Hellerstein, et al. (1996).
3Audit studies (see, e.g., Fix and Struyk, 1992) provide another tool for studying discrimination.
However, we are unaware of any academic audit studies assessing the role of age discrimination in hiring,
nor are they likely to prove very helpful in this particular context. One problem is that such methods are
useful primarily for studying entry-level jobs, which may not be the jobs in which age discrimination is
likely to occur. A second problem is that such studies attempt to make workers identical (at least on
average) on paper, except for the demographic characteristic being studied. But it is not possible to make
older and younger individuals identical on paper without giving the older individual extremely low job
experience, causing this individual to appear anomalous (Bloch, 1994).
-3-retirement (Ruhrn, 1990), Of course, separations and changes in employment status are often
undoubtedly voluntary, and do not reflect discriminatory behavior against older workers. However,
they may sometimes stem from discrimination, as suggested by the greater prevalence of
discouraged workers among the old (Rhine, 1978), by evidence of managerial preferences for
younger workers (Rosen and Jerdee, 1977), and by research indicating that older workers
experience discrimination with respect to mobility and layoffs (Pames and King, 1977; Hutchens,
1988).
Our findings suggest that age discrimination may bean important factor in determining job
separations and employment status of older workers. Approximately seven percent of our sample
of older workers report having experienced age discrimination in the workforce, and these workers
are much more likely to separate from their employer and to experience spells of non-employment
than workers who do not report age discrimination. The estimated effect of reported discrimination
remains large and significant even when controlling for the existence of mandatory retirement
provisions on the current job, implying that self-reported age discrimination is not just reflecting ex
post dissatisfaction with these provisions (Lazear, 1979). These findings are generally robust to our
attempts to correct our estimates for inherent limitations of self-reported data.
II. Data
To assess the impact of age discrimination on job separations and employment status, we
analyze data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Older Men (NLSOM). The NLSOM
collected information in 1966 on a national probability sample of 5,020 men between the ages of 45
and 59. They were surveyed periodically until 1983, at which time they ranged in age from 62 to
76.4 At each interview, respondents were questioned about their labor force participation. For
‘Respondents were interviewed in 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1971, 1973, 1975, 1976, 1978, 1980,
1981, and 1983. A final follow-up was conducted in 1990, but given the time lag between this final
-4-those at work, detailed information was collected on job characteristics, including years of job
tenure, occupation, industry, sector, mandatory retirement provisions, hourly wages (for some
years), and employment status, plus information about whether workers changed employers since
the previous interview. Pension coverage on the current job is available only in 1966 (as well as
selected years late in the panel). The survey also solicited information periodically about men’s
attitudes toward their current job, asking them if they liked their job very much or fairly well, or if
they somewhat or very much disliked its
Of particular interest for this study, and one of the unusual aspects of the survey, is the
information it includes about age discrimination. In 1971, 1976, and 1980, men were asked the
following question:
During the past five years, do you feel so far as work is concerned,
you were discriminated against because of your age?
Those who reported discrimination were then asked about the basis for their claims, and could cite
any of the following reasons: they were not hired or interviewed because of their age; they were not
promoted or assigned to a certain job because of their age; they were demoted or laid off because of
their age; they just feel the company discriminates; they feel there is general discrimination
throughout society; or some other unspecified reason.
III. Empirical Approach
The basic empirical strategy of this paper is to track the employment behavior of older
workers following a self-report of discrimination, to determine whether or not those who report
discrimination are subsequently more likely either to leave their current employer or to experience
interview and the previous interview and the age of the respondents (who range in age from 69 to 83 in
1990), we chose not to analyze these data here.
‘Information on union membership is available for only selected years of the panel, and thus is not
incorporated into our analysis.
-5-spells of non-employment than otherwise similar workers. Even if such an empirical relationship is
found, however, there are reasons to be cautious in concluding that a causal relationship exists
among older workers between age discrimination in the labor market and job separations and
changes in employment status. Consequently, this paper takes a number of different approaches to
assessing alternative explanations of such a finding.
To assess the impact of age discrimination, we estimate discrete-time hazard models of job
separations and employment status, This approach has been taken by a number of studies of
unemployment and retirement, including Ham and Rea (1987) and Blau (1994). For each
respondent in the sample, we create a separate record for each year he works for pay. Men who
stop working at some point but subsequently return to work re-enter the sample once they resume
working. Each time the respondent is obsemed at work, we observe two dichotomous outcomes –
he either remains at the current job into the next period or he leaves; and he is either employed in
the next period or not. These outcomes are assumed to depend upon a set of predictors, many of
which vary over time.
We assume that each worker has an underlying propensity to leave their current employer,
which we model as a function of self-reported discrimination and other controls,G
L*i~ = ~ + Xi~~+ Di~~+ ~i~ . (1)
L“i,is the propensity of individual i to leave the employer at time t, Xi, is a vector of control
variables, Di~is a dummy variable equal to one if the individual reports age discrimination during
some period before time t, and zero otherwise, and ~i~is a random disturbance term. L“itis not
observed; instead we observe a dummy variable Litwhich equals one if L*i~ exceeds some threshold
(normalized to zero), and zero otherwise. Thus, the probability that we observe a job separation is
bWecould equivalently frame the discussion in terms of employment status, the other outcome we
study.
-6-equal to 1 – F(– a - Xit ~ – Di~y), where F is the cumulative distribution function for ~. If we
assume that ~ follows a logistic distribution, we can estimate the parameters of(1) as a logit model.
In this equation, a positive estimate of y would indicate that individuals who report discrimination
are more likely to subsequently separate from their employer.
There are, however, a number of problems with inferring a causal impact of age
discrimination on job separations from the estimate of y in equation (l). First, there is evidence
from existing work with self-reported discrimination data (on sex discrimination) that there may be
an important heterogeneity problem with respect to which individuals report discrimination (Kuhn,
1987). In the present context, our estimates of y would be biased if an individual’s propensity to
report age discrimination were correlated with certain labor force activities. For example,
individuals who are highly committed to working at relatively old ages may be less likely to report
age discrimination, regardless of the actual level of discrimination experienced. In this case, there
would be a bias towards finding that discrimination leads to changes in employment, when in fact
the association would not represent a causal relationship stemming from discrimination.
One solution to this problem is to exploit the fact that most respondents provide more than
one self-report of age discrimination over the course of the panel. Workers who change their
reports (in either direction) provide valuable information on discrimination that may be
independent of individual-specific propensities to report discrimination. Thus, by identi~ing the
“effect” of discrimination from the labor market behavior of those who switch to reporting
discrimination, we maybe better able to estimate the causal effect of discrimination on the
employment decisions of older workers (see Neumark and McLennan, 1995). Focusing on multiple
responses from a given individual will not necessarily eliminate heterogeneity bias, however,
because there may be variation in the propensity to switch to reporting discrimination.
-7-Nonetheless, the use of multiple responses should go a long way in reducing heterogeneity bias.
Multiple discrimination reports can be incorporated into the hazard model in two ways.
First, we can replace Di~in equation (1) with three dummy variables to identi~ whether and in
which direction reports of discrimination change. The equation defining our latent variable on
which we base our logit estimates becomes
L“i,= a+ Xi, ~+ NDi,6+DDi, @+ DNi, A+ ~i, , (2)
where NDi~is a dummy variable set equal to one if a worker at time t who had previously reported
no discrimination then reports discrimination, DDi~is a dummy variable which equals one if the
worker reports discrimination continuously through time t, and DNi~is a dummy variable which
equals one if a worker who once reported discrimination subsequently reports no discrimination at
time t.7 The reference group is workers who never report discrimination through time t. If the
fixed propensity to report discrimination (independent of its actual existence) were positively
correlated with job separations, then the magnitude of $ would be large relative to 5 and -~. * We
would claim stronger evidence of age discrimination having a causal effect on separations if we
were to find that b in equation (2) were significantly greater than zero, and that Awere significantly
less than zero, although we regard the latter implication as less compelling since worker attachment
may be affected by past discrimination.
A second approach to using multiple reports to reduce the heterogeneity problem is simply
to restrict the analysis to the subset of individuals who do not report discrimination (and are
employed) the first time they are asked. Then, equation (1) can be estimated where D,t is the
‘In all cases, the second report used in defining these dummy variables is the most recent report as
of time t.
8Theparameter would also be large if the impact of discrimination experiences were cumulative,
so that workers are more likely to leave ajob the more often they experience discrimination.
-8-response to the discrimination question the second or third time it is asked. By estimating the
equation for this subset of individuals, the heterogeneity problem should be eliminated or at least
reduced because y is estimated conditioning out differences in initial responses to the
discrimination question.
A second problem is that individuals may incorrectly attribute to age discrimination
negative outcomes that are in fact unrelated to such discrimination, perhaps to rationalize these
negative outcomes. Because the y may respond to these negative outcomes by leaving their
employer or the labor force, we could then obtain spurious evidence of an effect of age
discrimination. We explore this potential problem by comparing the impact of discrimination
reports based on age with reports based on other factors, such as race. Some critics of age
discrimination legislation argue that these laws merely provide middle-aged white men the
opportunity to sue employers for negative job outcomes, as blacks, Hispanics, and women have
been able to do since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (see Friedman, 1984, for
examples), If this view is accurate, then non-whites should be less likely to report age
discrimination, and instead report race discrimination as the “cause” of an adverse labor market
outcome, particularly if race discrimination reports are seen as more credible than reports of age
discrimination. More importantly, the effect of age discrimination reports on job separations and
employment status should be considerably smaller for non-whites than for whites, while race
discrimination should be strongly associated with job separations and non-employment for non-
whites. Since the NLSOM includes questions about discrimination based on race, religion, and
nationality, in addition to age, we can test this idea by separately analyzing reports of age
discrimination among non-whites, comparing the effects of reported age discrimination and race
discrimination (and the incidence of the former).
-9-A third problem with the interpretation of estimates of equation(1) is that workers facing
the prospect of mandatory retirement as part of long-tern incentive contracts might nonetheless
report age discrimination prior to retirement, because mandatory retirement is involuntary ex post
on the part of the worker. In this case, evidence of a link between reported age discrimination and
subsequent job separations or changes in employment status would not provide evidence in favor of
age discrimination or against long-term contracts. Rather, the self-reports would simply reflect
workers’ ex post dissatisfaction with the prospect of mandatory retirement. A solution to this
problem is to exploit the information in the NLSOM about the existence of mandatory retirement
provisions on the current job. We therefore add a dummy variable MRi~to equation (l), to indicate
whether a worker faced mandatory retirement during the period covered by the discrimination self-
report, as in
L*iE = ~ + Xi~~+ Di~7 + M~[6 + ~i~ > (3)
and test whether y is greater than zero (or the corresponding test for equation (2)).
We also introduce additional explanatory variables into the estimating equations. For
example, we control for workers’ afiitudes toward their cu~ent job. Disentangling the effects Of
general dissatisfaction with one’s job from the effects of reported age discrimination reduces the
likelihood that our estimates of the effects of discrimination merely reflect negative job
characteristics or outcomes, which should be captured by the attitudinal measure. In some of our
regressions, we also interact the age discrimination indicator with the worker’s age and control for
the reasons cited by respondents for their age discrimination reports, since workers who claim
discrimination because of treatment received on the current job maybe more likely to leave that job
than workers who report discrimination because they were not hired or interviewed for another job.
A final problem we confront arises from limitations of the structure of the data. Workers
-1o-are asked whether they have experienced age discrimination at any time over the past five years,
Thus, we can link discrimination to a particular job only for those workers who work at only one
job during the entire five-year period. Although we conduct some of our analyses on samples
restricted to workers with only one employer in any five-year period, the selectivity of this sample
makes these results somewhat suspect, since workers who remain with an employer perceived to
engage in discriminatory practices may not be typical of most workers. Most of our analysis is
instead based on the entire sample of workers, and we are in effect assuming that workers who
experience any discrimination in the past five years experience discrimination in all jobs over that
period. For example, a worker who reports age discrimination over the last five years in 1971 is
treated as if he reports discrimination continuously from 1966 to 1971, and we study the
relationship between discrimination reported in 1971 and subsequent behavior. By sometimes
incorrectly assigning reported discrimination to jobs where none is perceived, this approach will
generate downward-biased estimates of the effect of age discrimination on employment. Given that
we find evidence of effects of age discrimination, this source of bias only strengthens our
conclusions.
IV. Description of Sample
The NLSOM data that we analyze cover the period 1966 to 1980. While these data are not
very recent, we think it is instructive to study the effects of age discrimination in the period prior to
passage or rigorous enforcement of the ADEA, in order to assess whether the ADEA was
responding to legitimate concerns regarding age discrimination. Although the ADEA was passed
in 1968, responsibility for its enforcement rested with the Department of Labor until 1978, and few
resources were devoted toward this goal. In 1978 enforcement shified to the EEOC, and the
director of that agency sought to give age discrimination the same emphasis as race and sex
-11-discrimination. This seemed to occur. The Department of Labor received about 1,000 complaints
of age discrimination in 1969, which climbed to 5,000 in 1976. By 1982, after enforcement had
switched to the EEOC, the number of complaints climbed to 11,000. (Friedman (1984) provides a
historical overview of the ADEA.) The ADEA also had more significant effects beginning in 1978
because amendments to the Act increased the mandatory retirement age from 65 to 70 in that year,
bringing many additional workers under its protection.
Our extract includes observations on all survey years in which a respondent was working at
a job, from 1966 to 1980, for a total of 19,270 observations on 3,001 respondents.9 (Since
information on discrimination is not available in 1981 and 1983, observations for these years are
not included in the sample. However, employment information in 1981 is used to identifi workers
who leave employers or become non-employed between 1980 and 1981.) Sample means, for the
person-year observations, are reported in columns 1-3 of Table 1, first for all workers and then
separately for those who do and do not report age discrimination.
Overall, 22 percent of workers leave their job each year, and about one-half of these
separations lead to a spell of non-employment. The incidence of spells of non-employment
increases sharply with age, Almost one-fifth of workers over the age of55 are not employed at the
following interview, compared to only four percent of workers age 55 and younger. For 47 percent
of all observations, workers are subject to mandatory retirement, and for 65 percent of the
observations workers received pension coverage on the job they held in 1966. Health limitations,
defined each year as health problems which the respondent claims limit the amount or type of work
9A11 observations for men who were not working in 1966, or were self-employed in 1966, were
first eliminated from the sample. In addition, all observations with missing discrimination reports in any
year were excluded from the analysis. When other variables used in the analysis are missing in a
particular year, the value of the variable is set equal to zero and the corresponding missing variable
dummy is set equal to one.
-12-he is able to perfom, affect 23 percent of the sample. Only six percent of the sample dislike (either
somewhat or very much) their current job, The mean level of tenure on the current job is 14.6
years. Twenty percent of the sample is employed in the public sector.
Approximately seven percent of the observations include positive reports of age
discrimination that occurred over the past five years, The incidence of discrimination reports is
somewhat higher among workers over age 55 (8°/0) than among workers age 55 and younger (60/0).
Workers who report discrimination are much more likely to separate from their jobs during the next
period (37Y0vs. 21Yo)and to experience a spell of non-employment(18% vs. 11Yo). These
differences hold both for workers age 55 and younger and for those over 55, although the
differences are larger in relative terms for the younger group. As a result of their higher separation
propensities, workers reporting discrimination have 2.5 fewer years of job tenure, on average, than
workers who report no discrimination. Reporters and non-reporters appear to differ systematically
in other ways, as well. For example, those who report age discrimination have significantly more
schooling and more health problems and are significantly less likely to have had pension coverage
in 1966 or to be employed in the public sector. Non-reporters in the sample have higher hourly
earnings and are much less likely to dislike their job.
As a purely descriptive exercise to reveal the partial associations between reported age
discrimination and the other explanatory variables in our model, we estimate a logit equation for
reporting discrimination. Results are presented in column 4 of Table 1, with standard errors
reported in parentheses and odds ratios in square brackets. As we expected, dissatisfaction with the
current job is strongly positively correlated with discrimination reports; the likelihood of reporting
discrimination is more than twice as high among disgruntled workers than among workers who are
at least somewhat content with their job, holding other factors constant. Workers with health
-13-problems, divorced workers, and workers subject to mandatory retirement ages on the job are also
much more likely to report discrimination. Age and schooling also have significant positive
associations. Workers with higher wages and more years of experience with the employer,
however, are significantly less likely to claim discrimination, as are those in the public sector and
those who were covered by pension benefits on the job held in 1966. Race does not appear to have
a significant effect on the likelihood of reporting age discrimination. The significant associations
of reported age discrimination with observable characteristics of workers highlights the importance
of attempting to eliminate bias from heterogeneity in the propensity to report discrimination.
V. Results
Job Separations
Estimates from our basic hazard model of job separations are reported in Table 2. The
dependent variable is equal to one if the worker leaves his current employer before the next
interview (in either one or two years, depending on the interview year), and zero otherwise. In
column 1, the explanatory variables include the self report of age discrimination, year dummies to
capture macroeconomic influences on individual labor market decisions and differences in the
number of years until the next interview date (and thus differences in the length of exposure to the
risk of job separation), and personal characteristics of the worker (the presence of any health
limitations, years of completed schooling, race, marital status, SMSA residence, and age entered up
to a quartic).10 Column 2 adds mandatory retirement provisions to the specification. A dummy
variable indicating the existence of a mandato~ retirement age on the current job is interacted with
three age dummies, to enable the effects of mandatory retirement to differ for workers age 55 and
‘OInspecifications not reported here, the year dummies were replaced by a dummy variable
identifying two-year survey intervals. As expected, the likelihood of separating from the current employer
is greater during these longer intervals than during the one-year intervals.
-14-younger, older than 55 butyounger than65, andolderthan 65. Other jobcharacteristics are added
in column 3, including an indicator for pension coverage on the job held in 1966, years of
experience on the current job (up to a quartic), a dummy variable identifying jobs held in the public
sector, and one-digit industry and occupational controls. This specification is repeated in column 4,
after dropping the industry and occupational controls and including among the covariates the
predicted value of the real log wage (to avoid bias from influences of anticipated future behavior on
wages); the real wage is predicted by ordinary least squares, utilizing all the covariates included in
column 3. Column 5 adds a dummy variable to identi@ workers who report that they somewhat
dislike or very much dislike their current job. Column 6 repeats this specification, but excludes the
predicted wage and includes the occupational and industry controls in the estimating equation.
Finally, column 7 repeats column 6 after introducing interaction terms to permit the effect of
reported age discrimination to differ between workers age 55 and younger and those older than age
55.
The estimated coefficients on self-reported age discrimination presented in Table 2 are
positive, large, and statistically significant. In column 1, with the fewest controls, workers
reporting age discrimination are more than twice as likely to separate from their employer than are
workers who report no age discrimination. The estimated coefficient is quite robust to changes in
the way the estimating equation is specified. For example, although the inclusion of the full set of
controls in columns 5 and 6 reduces the size of the estimated coefficient by about 20 percent,
relative to column 1, the reported odds ratios indicate that workers with positive reports are still 1.9
times as likely to separate as workers who do not report discrimination. The logit model estimated
in column 5 indicates that workers who report no age discrimination in 1966 will remain with their
-15-current employer for 1.2 years longer than workers who report discrimination. 1t Although
discrimination reports are somewhat more prevalent among workers over the age of 55, the
estimated effect of reporting discrimination is substantially larger for workers age 55 and younger,
who may have more alternative employment options than older workers.
Mandatory retirement provisions appear to affect job separation rates. However, the
inclusion of mandatory retirement in the estimating equation does not reduce the magnitude or
significance of the age discrimination coefficient, as can be seen from comparing columns 1 and 2,
suggesting that workers are referring to employment practices that extend beyond the imposition of
mandatory retirement ages when they report age discrimination. Workers between the ages of 56
and 65 on jobs which impose mandatory retirement ages are significantly more likely to separate
from their employers than workers on jobs with no mandatory retirement provisions, presumably
because these workers have reached the mandatory retirement age and are required to leave. The
estimated incremental effect ranges from 17 to 32 percent, depending upon the specification.’2 For
workers under 55, mandatory retirement provisions sharply decrease separation rates. This effect is
consistent with Lazear’s long-term incentive contracts. According to Lazear’s model, senior
workers in firms with mandatory retirement provisions earn wages above the value of their
marginal product, or expect to earn high wages in the near future, which discourages them from
leaving the firm. Mandatory retirement has no significant effect on workers afier age 65, an age at
“Based on the model estimates, the expected number of additional years on the current job for
workers in 1966 who never report age discrimination is 7.9 years, whereas for workers who always report
age discrimination expected additional years on the job is 6.7 years. For this calculation, other variables in
the model were set at their sample means, with tenure and age increasing each year after 1966.
‘zThecoefficient on the mandatory retirement dummy for workers ages 56 to 65 is negative in
column 2, however, when industry and occupation controls (and all other job characteristics) are excluded
from the specification, suggesting that the imposition of mandatory retirement provisions varies by industry
and occupation.
-16-which very few workers are still subject to mandatory retirement provisions.
Another possible explanation for the strong observed effect of age discrimination on job
separations is that workers who are simply unhappy with their job – perhaps because of some
negative job characteristic or outcome unrelated to discrimination – separate and nonetheless claim
discrimination. Including an indicator of job dissatisfaction helps to solve this problem, as long as
any such negative characteristics or outcomes are reflected in reported dissatisfaction, Indeed, we
find that dissatisfied workers, who report that they somewhat dislike their current job or dislike it
very much, have much higher separation rates than men who are more content with their job. The
probability of a job separation is 74 percent higher among workers reporting job dissatisfaction.
However, the size of the discrimination effect falls only slightly, by less than ten percent, when job
dissatisfaction is added to the estimating equation. Thus, the basis for claiming age discrimination
appears to go beyond general dissatisfaction with one’s employer.
Many of the other explanatory variables in the model have significant effects on job
separations. Separation rates are higher among workers who are relatively old, experience health
problems that limit their ability to work, and earn high wages. These characteristics have also been
shown to increase retirement probabilities (e.g., Quinn, et al., 1990). Separation rates are lower
among workers who are married, well-educated, and employed in the public sector, and who have
many years of experience with the current employer and received pension coverage on the job held
in 1966. Separation rates do not vary significantly by race, controlling for the real wage. 13
13 The standard errors reported in Table 2 may be understated, due to the dependence among
repeated observations on individuals. To assess the influence on our conclusions of downward bias in our
standard errors, we re-estimated the model on a sample restricted to one randomly-selected observation per
respondent. The estimated effects of reported age discrimination remain large and highly significant. For
example, the coefficient on reported age discrimination is 0.83, with a standard error of 0.16, for the model
in column 5, and 0.82, with a standard error of 0.16, for the model in column 6.
-17-Changes in Employment Status
To this point, our analysis of job separations has ignored the employment status of
separated workers. However, workers who leave their current job have several options: they can
move to another job, become self-employed, or stop working altogether. We turn now to the
question of whether perceived age discrimination increases the likelihood that workers will
separate from their employer and not find employment elsewhere.
The hazard models are re-estimated using the same specifications as in Table 2, except that
now the dichotomous dependent variable each year is equal to one only if the worker does not
report any work at the subsequent interview. We do not separately identifi individuals who are
actively seeking work but remain unemployed, since the distinction between these workers and
discouraged workers is ofien arbitrary (Clark and Summers, 1979).]4 The results, which are
reported in Table 3, tell the same basic story as the findings for job separations. As before, the
estimated coefficients on reported age discrimination are positive, large, and statistically
significant, and robust to the inclusion of additional controls in the estimating equation, Workers
who report discrimination are between 72 percent and 83 percent more likely to experience a spell
of non-employment than workers who report no discrimination, depending upon the exact
specification. Workers between the ages of56 and 65 subject to mandatory retirement provisions
and workers who report job dissatisfaction are much more likely to experience a spell of non-
employment than are workers not subject to mandatory retirement and workers content with their
jobs.15 However, controlling for these factors has little effect on the size or significance of the
14This maybe particularly true for old workers for whom discouragement is more prevalent
(Rhine, 1978).
15Mandatory retirement provisions do not affect employment rates for workers younger than 56 or
older than 65.
-18-discrimination coefficient, suggesting once again that age discrimination reports do not simply
reflect dismay over mandatory retirement or general job dissatisfaction. The estimates reported in
column 5 imply that workers who report no discrimination remain employed for 0.6 years longer
than workers who report age discrimination. 16Relatively young workers (age 55 and under) with
positive reports are less likely to be employed than older workers who report discrimination.
The effects of other variables in the model are generally consistent with the retirement
literature. Rates of employment are lower among workers who are relatively old, experience health
problems, and earn high wages. 17
Correcting For Potential Heterogeneity Bias
The estimated impact of age discrimination on job separations and employment status
reported in Tables 2 and 3 may be biased upward if heterogeneity in the propensity to report
discrimination results in those workers who report discrimination being more likely to leave their
jobs, independent of any causal effect of discrimination, as noted in Section III above. Some
indication of the extent to which individual-level heterogeneity affects the propensity to report
discrimination may be provided by exploring the persistence of age discrimination reports over
time. If positive discrimination reports arise largely from the propensity of individuals to claim
discrimination, regardless of the actual behavior of employers, then discrimination reports by a
given individual are likely to be relatively consistent over time. In particular, an individual who
lbThe model predicts that in 1966, for a worker with mean characteristics who never reports
discrimination, expected additional continuous years of employment is 8.8 years, compared with 8.2 years
for the mean worker who reports discrimination.
“TO assess the influence of downward bias in our reported standard errors, we again re-estimate
the models on a sample restricted to one random observation per respondent. The discrimination
coefficients corresponding to columns 5 and 6, respectively, are 0.41 with a standard error of 0.20 and 0.37
with a standard error of 0.21. Thus, the evidence is a bit weaker for changes in employment status than for
separations overall.
-19-reported discrimination in the past would be likely to report discrimination in the future, even after
moving to a different employer. If, however, discrimination reports were based solely on employer
practices, then individuals with positive reports in the past would be no more likely to report
discrimination after changing employers than workers who never reported discrimination.
We investigate persistence in discrimination reports by relating the likelihood of reporting
discrimination in the years 1973-1976 and 1978-80 to earlier discrimination reports, permitting the
relationship to differ between workers who reported past discrimination by former employers and
workers who reported past discrimination by current employers. Logit estimates are reported in
columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, for specifications which include the fall set of controls as in columns 5
and 6, respectively, of Table 2. Workers with positive past reports are significantly more likely to
report discrimination in the current period. The coefficient on past discrimination is much larger
for individuals who continue to work for the same discriminating employer than for workers who
have moved to new employers, suggesting that many of these reports reflect employer-specific
behavior. However, the large and positive effect on current discrimination of past discrimination
reports that relate to former employers suggests that certain workers – even afier they change
employers – may be more likely to report discrimination than others, regardless of employer
behavior. Thus, if those workers who are more prone to report discrimination are also more
to leave their current job, the estimates reported in Tables 2 and 3 may be partly driven by
ikely
heterogeneity, not the causal effect of age discrimination on job separations and employment status.
We confront the heterogeneity problem by focusing on workers whose discrimination
reports change over the course of the panel, in effect conditioning out individual differences in
reporting behavior. Panel A of Table 5 presents estimates based on the same specifications
described in columns 5 and 6 of Tables 2 and 3 (which utilize the full set of control variables), but
-20-replacing the single dummy for reported age discrimination with three dummy variables which
serve to separately identi~ workers who switch discrimination reports, workers who always report
discrimination, and workers who never report discrimination. The construction of these variables
is described below,
Each of the three dummies is defined as of the year of the observation, Between 1966 and
1971, workers are coded as “reports age discrimination continuously” if they report discrimination
in 1971. They are coded similarly from 1972 to 1976 if they report discrimination in 1971 and
1976, and likewise for 1977-80 if they report discrimination all three times (in 1971, 1976 and
1980). About five percent of the sample reports age discrimination continuously, The second
dummy defines workers who switch to reporting discrimination. By definition, this variable equals
zero for all workers during years 1966-71. From 1972-76, it is set equal to one for workers who
did not report discrimination in 1971 but subsequently report discrimination in 1976. The
“switching to reporting discrimination” dummy equals one from 1977-80 for workers who report
discrimination in 1980 but did not report any in 1971, 1976, or either year. About two percent of
the sample observations are included in this category. The final dummy defines workers in years
they switch from reporting discrimination to reporting no discrimination, and is defined in the same
manner as the “switching to” variable. This variable is equal to one for 1.6 percent of the
observations.
Turning to Panel A of Table 5, we see that workers who report discrimination continuously
are much more likely to leave the current employer than workers who never report discrimination
or who report discrimination in some but not all years. Controlling for the full set of personal and
job characteristics, the predicted real wage, and attitudes toward the job, workers with continuous
discrimination reports are more than twice as likely as non-reporters to separate from their jobs.
-21-Workers who report discrimination after having reported no discrimination in a previous period are
about one-half as likely to leave the current employer as workers who report continuously,
Although this result might reflect the more persistent discrimination experienced by the latter group
of workers, it also may identify intrinsic differences in job separation behavior between those who
do and do not report discrimination continuously (i.e., heterogeneity bias). Nonetheless, we
continue to find strong evidence for a causal effect of reported job discrimination on job
separations; hazard rates are almost 50 percent higher among workers who switch to reporting
discrimination than among workers who never report discrimination.’8
Turning to employment status, the impact of continuously reporting age discrimination is
quite similar in magnitude to the effect we estimate for job separation rates. Workers who
continuously report discrimination are more than twice as likely to experience a spell of non-
employment as workers who never report discrimination. However, switching to reporting age
discrimination has a much smaller positive effect on the employment hazard, suggesting that much
of the effect of discrimination reports on employment status estimated in Table 3 may simply
reflect heterogeneity bias. The estimated effect is insignificant in column 3, and is marginally
significant (p < .12) in column 4. Switching from reporting discrimination has an insignificant
negative effect on the employment hazard, which is the anticipated sign if discrimination
discourages employment.
An alternative way to implement this approach to the heterogeneity problem is to analyze
the impact of perceived age discrimination among workers who initially report no discrimination
(in 1971). The specifications from columns 5 and 6 of Tables 2 and 3 are repeated for the years
‘*No significant effect on job separations was found for reporting no discrimination afier having
made a positive report in a previous period, As mentioned earlier, we do not interpret this last result as
strong evidence against an effect of age discrimination on separations, since the impact of past
discrimination may persist into subsequent periods.
-22-1973-80 for the sample of initial non-reporters. More than six percent of the observations in this
sample include positive discrimination reports. Estimated effects of reported age discrimination for
this sample, reported in Panel B of Table 5, are substantially smaller than the corresponding
estimates in Tables 2 and 3, but they are nonetheless large and statistically significant. Among
workers who initially report no discrimination, workers who later provide positive reports are about
60 percent more likely to separate from their employer and up to 39 percent more likely to
experience a spell of non-employment than workers who never report age discrimination.
Although these results confirm our suspicion that part of the observed effect of discrimination
reports reflects heterogeneity in the propensity to report discrimination, they also provide evidence
that age discrimination has real effects on job separations and employment status, with the evidence
particularly strong for separations. 19
The other main problem with interpreting the evidence as identifying causal effects of
discrimination is that workers may incorrectly attribute to discrimination other adverse labor
market outcomes, to which they respond by leaving their job. We address this issue by focusing on
the reports of non-white workers. Non-whites maybe less likely than whites to attribute problems
in the workplace to age discrimination, because they can “attribute” their problems to race
discrimination, which may be more credible. Table 6 reports the results of re-estimating the logit
equations of columns 5 and 6 of Tables 2 and 3 and columns
a sample of non-white workers. In addition to the covariates
1 – 4 of the lower panel of Table 5 on
in the earlier estimations, the
equations now include an indicator for reporting discrimination based on race, religion, or
‘9When the sample is further restricted to one random observation per respondent to correct for the
potential underreporting of standard errors, the estimated effects of age discrimination on job separations
becomes marginally significant (p < .09) in column 1 of Panel B, but remains significant (p < .05) in
column 2. The estimated effect on employment status become insignificant, as the standard errors in
columns 3 and 4 increase to 0.20 and 0.18, respectively.
-23-nationality. Among all observations on non-white workers in our sample, 6.8 percent report age
discrimination and 6.5 percent report other types of discrimination (most of which are based on
race).
The percentage reporting age discrimination is essentially the same as for the full sample,
indicating that white males are hardly more likely to report age discrimination; in and of itself, this
casts doubt on the interpretation of reported age discrimination as reflecting primarily other adverse
labor market outcomes. More importantly, the estimated effects of age discrimination on job
separations and employment status among non-whites are quite similar to the observed effects
among all workers. Non-white workers who report age discrimination are about twice as likely
both to separate from their employer and to experience a spell of non-employment as non-whites
who report no age discrimination. This effect is much larger than the effect of race and other types
of reported discrimination. Non-white workers who report other types of discrimination are only
39 percent to 45 percent more likely to separate from their job than workers who do not report other
types of discrimination. The effect of other types of discrimination on employment status is small
and insignificant. When the sample is restricted to non-white workers who initially report no
discrimination, in order to reduce potential heterogeneity bias, the results, as reported in Panel B of
Table 6, are again quite similar to the results for workers of all races. Non-white workers who
report age discrimination in the later years of the panel are between 60 percent and 75 percent more
likely to separate from their job and about 30 percent more likely to experience non-employment,
than are non-white workers who never report age discrimination. However, the estimated effects
on employment status are statistically insignificant. The observed effect of other types of reported
discrimination disappear when the sample is restricted to non-white workers who initially report no
age discrimination. The results in Table 6 bolster the validity of the age discrimination self reports.
-24-Additional Tests of Robustness
Tables 7 and 8 report on additional analyses designed to further test the robustness of our
estimates of the effects of age discrimination on job separations and employment status. We
investigate the impact of restricting the sample to workers with only one employer over the period
during which they report discrimination, and of allowing the effects of discrimination to vary by the
reason respondents give for their discrimination reports, for a sample restricted to workers who
initially report no discrimination.
Workers claim age discrimination of different types, and our interpretation of the effect of
discrimination on job and labor force attachment can depend upon the type of discrimination cited
by workers in their self-reports. In particular, workers who report discrimination because they were
not hired or interviewed because of their age may react differently than workers who base their age
discrimination claims on other factors. On one hand, discrimination based on withheld job offers
or interviews is unlikely to lead workers to leave their current job, since the discriminatory
behavior would not generally have been committed by the current employer, Hence, the inclusion
of discrimination of this type with other types of discrimination may bias downward the overall
estimated effect of age discrimination on job separations. On the other hand, workers who report
discrimination because they were unable to secure certain jobs or interviews were presumably
seeking new employment in the recent past and may be more likely to leave future jobs or to
withdraw from the labor force than other workers, leading to upward biased estimates of the effect
of overall age discrimination on job separations and employment status.
To account for these possibilities we distinguish reports of age discrimination based on lost
job offers and interviews from other types of age discrimination that more plausibly reflect
treatment received on the current job. Among workers who initially report no discrimination,
-25-approximately ten percent of workers who subsequently report discrimination claim that the
discrimination occurred because they were not hired or interviewed.20 Logit equations for both job
separations and employment status are re-estimated, based on the specifications from columns 1-4
of the bottom panel of Table 5, replacing the reported discrimination dummy variable with a
dummy which equals one if the worker reports discrimination because he was not hired or
interviewed because of his age (zero otherwise), and another dummy which equals one if the
worker reports discrimination for any other reason (zero otherwise). The results are presented in
Table 7.
The estimated effects of reported age discrimination not related to hiring or interviewing are
quite similar to the results reported in Panel B of Table 5, which is not surprising since a small
fraction of reports are related to hiring or interviewing. Workers who report discrimination not
related to hiring or interviewing in the later years of the survey (afier initially reporting no
discrimination) are about 66 to 70 percent more likely to separate from their job than workers who
never report age discrimination. The effect on job separations of age discrimination related to
hiring or interviewing is somewhat smaller than the effect of discrimination not related to hiring,
and statistically insignificant. Thus, in this sample of initial non-reporters, which is presumably
less susceptible to heterogeneity bias, discrimination reports related to hiring do not appear to
reflect the relatively high quit propensities of these workers, Hiring-related discrimination has
larger effects on employment status than does discrimination not related to hiring or interviewing.
Workers who report discrimination because they were not hired or interviewed are about 70 to 75
percent more likely to experience a spell of non-employment than workers who never report age
discrimination. However, these estimates are imprecisely measured, and are at best marginally
‘“Among all workers, about one in four discrim ination reports are related to hiring or interviewing.
-26-significant. Workers who report discrimination not related to hiring or interviewing are about 28 to
36 percent more likely to experience a spell of non-employment than workers who never report
discrimination.
The validity of our results may also be questioned because of the uncertainty surrounding
the timing of the discrimination experience. As noted earlier, the discrimination reports available
in the data refer to experiences over the previous five years. Thus it is not clear when the
discrimination began, or which employer is at fault when workers held more than one job during
the period. We explore the potential ramifications of this data limitation by re-estimating our logit
models on a sample restricted to workers with no more than one employer during each of the five-
year reporting periods, and to workers who initially report no age discrimination. The results,
reported in Table 8, are quite similar to our earlier estimates reported in Panel B of Table 5.
Controlling for the full set of explanatory variables, workers who report discrimination are
approximately 50 percent more likely to separate from their current employer than workers who
report no discrimination, The effect of age discrimination on employment status is somewhat
smaller, as workers with positive reports are fi-om 32 percent to 41 percent more likely to
experience a spell of non-employment than workers who report no discrimination. Although these
estimates are based on a very select sample, they corroborate the fill-sample results based on the
somewhat less accurate classification of workers experiencing discrimination on the current job.
Additional Consequences ofAge Discrimination
Although our evidence suggests that workers who report age discrimination are more likely
to experience a spell of non-employment than other workers, we have not explored the likelihood
that respondents reporting discrimination retire from the labor force or the duration of their spells
of non-employment. These issues are addressed by re-estimating the logit models reported in the
-27-bottom panel of Table 5 using alternative measures of labor force status as the dependent variable,
Theresults ~epresented in Table9. Incolumns land2, thedependent variable equals oneifthe
respondent reports retirement as his major activity during the survey week of the subsequent
interview (zero otherwise). In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable equals one if the respondent
reports that he is not employed and not looking for work at the time of the subsequent interview
(zero otherwise). Finally, in columns 5 and 6 the dependent variable equals one if the respondent is
not working in either of the next two interviews (zero otherwise). The estimated coefficients on
age discrimination, among workers who initially report no discrimination, are small and statistically
insignificant in all of the specifications reported in Table 9, indicating that workers do not respond
to age discrimination by retiring or otherwise dropping out of the labor force, and that age
discrimination does not generate persistent spells of non-employment. Instead, the effect of age
discrimination appears to operate through job separations, which are sometimes followed by
relatively short spells of non-employment.
Although this evidence does not indicate that age discrimination leads to early retirement or
long spells of non-employment, workers reporting age discrimination who separate from their
employers or become non-employed do appear to pay a substantial cost, in the form of lower wages
on their new job or when they become re-employed. Table 10 reports ordinary least squares
estimates of equations for the change in the log real wage, measured from the time of the report to
the subsequent job or re-employment. In column 1, the estimating equation includes the dummy
variable for reporting age discrimination. In column 2, this variable is interacted with dummies
indicating whether or not the respondent subsequently left his employer, In column 3, the age
discrimination variable is interacted with dummies indicating whether or not a spell of non-
employment followed. In each column, the specifications also include changes in disability,
-28-marital status, age and age squared, and SMSA residence. Compared to workers who report no
discrimination, the estimated wage change is seven percent lower for workers who report age
discrimination and separate from their employer, and 13 percent lower for workers for workers who
report age discrimination and experience a subsequent spell of non-employment. Workers who
report age discrimination but do not separate from their employer or do not become non-employed
do not experience lower wage growth than nonreporters,21
VI. Conclusions
Although economists have devoted considerable effort to investigating sex and race
discrimination in the labor market, there has been very little empirical research on the prevalence
and consequences of discrimination based on age. The effects of age discrimination are difficult to
measure because the standard economic approach to the study of discrimination – attributing to
discrimination the differences in labor market outcomes that persist afier controlling for all
observable differences in productivity-related characteristics – cannot be applied in a compelling
fashion to older workers because of the strong possibility that age itself affects individual
productivity.
In this paper, we take a different approach by analyzing self-reports of discrimination. We
find that about seven percent of our sample of older male workers report that they experienced age
discrimination in the workplace during the period 1966 to 1980. Workers who reported age
discrimination were much more likely to separate from their employer and less likely to remain
employed, even afier controlling for many personal and job characteristics, including the presence
of mandatory retirement provisions on the job and general job dissatisfaction, These findings are
generally robust to our many attempts to correct our estimates for the inherent limitations of self-
21Thislatter finding provides further evidence that age discrimination reports do not simply reflect
adverse labor market outcomes, at least insofar as they are reflected in lower wage growth.
-29-reported data, particularly the potential heterogeneity bias that arises from differences in the
propensity to report discrimination, and the likelihood of attributing to discrimination other
negative labor market outcomes.
Our evidence indicates that age discrimination in the workplace maybe (or may have been)
a serious problem that provides a basis for legislation restricting discrimination against older
workers. Alternative approaches to studying the prevalence and consequences of age
discrimination, and for assessing the impact of the ADEA, should be high on the research agenda of
those studying older workers in the labor market.
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Descriptive Statistics and Correlates of Reported Age Discrimination, 1966-1980a




Job separation in next period
Age <55
Age >55
Not working in next period
Age <55
Age~55
Mandatory retirement in current
job





Workers reporting reporting Logit estimates
discrimination in discrimination in of reported
All workers last 5 years last 5 years discrimination
(1) (2) (3) (4)
.07 ... ... . .
(.002)
.06 ... ... ...
(.002)
.08 ... . . ..
(.003)
,22 .37 .21 ..
(.003) (.01) (.003)
.16 .29 .15 ..
(.004) (.02) (.004)
.29 .44 .28 .
(.005) (.02) (.005)
.11 .18 .11 ..
(.002) (.01) (.002)
.04 .08 .04 ..
(.002) (.01) (.002)
.19 .26 .18 ..
(.004) (.02) (.004)
.47 .48 .47 .29
(.004) (,027) (.005) (,08)
[1.33]
.65 .60 .65 -.16
(.003) (.01) (.004) (.07)
[0.85]
.23 .31 .22 .39
(.003) (.01) (.003) (.06)
[1.48]
14.59 12.26 14.77 -.02
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19.720 1.403 18.317 19,720
a. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Means are sometimes based on less than the full sample because of missing data for
some variables.
b. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and odds ratios are reported in square brackets. The estimated effect of the real
wage is calculated from a separate logit for the subset of years for which wages are available.Table 2
Logit Estimates for Job Separations, 1966-1980’
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-9476.7 -8661.3 -8785.7 -8743.4 -8623.3 -8621.7
a, The sample, which is restricted to respondents with a job, not self-employed, at the time of each survey, includes 19,720
observations. Observations missing data on the dependent variable or reported age discrimination are deleted. For all other
variables, missing observations are set to zero, and dummy variables indicating such observations are included in the estimating
equation. Standard errors of coefficient estimates are reported in parentheses, and odds ratios are reported in square brackets.
b, The real log wage is predicted by an OLS log wage equation estimated on the sample of respondents with valid wage data. In
addition to all of the variables in the separation logit, one-digit industry and occupation dummy variables are included in the log
wage equation.Table 3









retirement, age s 55
Subject to mandatory
retirement, 55< age s 65
Subject to mandatory
retirement, age >65
Covered by pension in 1966
Predicted real log wage
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-5470.3 -5518.7 -5506.5 -5459.3 -5457.5
“
a. The dependent variable equals one if respondent is not employed at the next interview, zero otherwise. There are 19,720
observations. Additional control variables in each column are the same as in Table 2. See the footnotes to Table 2 for details.Table 4
Logit Estimates for Age Discrimination Reports, 1973-1980’
Reports age discrimination in
previous self-report, at same
employer (N = 170)
Reports age discrimination in
previous self-report, with
different employer (N= 181)
Predicted real log wage included






















a, There are 6,089 observations. The sample is smaller than in the previous tables because we
use data beginning only in 1973. The specification also includes all variables included in
columns 5 and 6 of Table 2, except for the age discrimination variables. See footnotes to Table
2 for details.Table 5
Logit Estimates of Job Separations and Employment Status,
Distinguishing Workers Who Change Age Discrimination Reportsa
Reports age discrimination
continuously (N= 101O)
Switches to reporting age
discrimination (N= 393)
Switches from reporting age
discrimination (N= 310)
Predicted real log wage included
One-digit industry and occupation
included
Log-likelihood









































B. Workers Initially Reporting No Age Discrimination, 1973-1980
Job Se~arations Em~lovment Status
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reports age discrimination .46 .47 .28 .33
(N=369) (.12) (.12) (.13) (.13)
[1.59] [1.61] [1.32] [1.39]
Predicted real log wage included Yes No Yes No
One-digit industry and occupation No Yes No Yes
included
Log-likelihood -3060.9 -3030.4 -2578.8 -2548.6
a. There are 19,720 observations in Panel A, and 5,762 observations in Panel B. Additional control variables
are the same as in columns 5 and 6 of Tables 2 and 3. See footnotes to Table 2 for details.
b. The age discrimination reporting variables are defined here as of the year of observation. Thus, observations
in 1966-1971 are coded as “reports age discrimination continuously” if workers report age discrimination in
1971. They are coded similarly in 1973-76 if they report age discrimination in 1971 and 1976, and are coded
similarly in 1978-80 if they report age discrimination in 1971, 1976, and 1980. Observations in 1972-1976 are
coded as “switches to reporting age discrimination” if they report no age discrimination in 1971 and age
discrimination in 1976. They are coded similarly for 1978-1980 if they report no age discrimination in 1971, no
age discrimination in 1976, or no age discrimination in both 1971 and 1976. Observations are coded as switches
from reporting age discrimination in parallel fashion.Table 6
Logit Estimates of Job Separations and Employment Status,
Among Non-Whites Only’
A. All Workers, 1966-1980
Job Se~arations
(1) (2)
Reports age discrimination .73 .73
(N= 405) (.13) (.13)
[2.07] [2.07]
Reports other type of discrimination .37 .33
(N= 390) (.14) (,14)
[1.45] [1,39]
Predicted real log wage included Yes No
One-digit industry and occupation No Yes
included





















B. Workers Initially Reporting No Age Discrimination, 1973-1980
Job Se~arations Emulovment Status
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reports age discrimination .56 .47 .31 .27
(N= 83) (.28) (.28) (.29) (.27)
[1.75] [1.60] [1.36] [1.31]
Reports other type of discrimination .01 .03 .04 .03
(N= 108) (.26) (.27) (.29) (,29)
[1.01] [1.03] [1.04] [1.03]
Predicted real log wage included Yes No Yes No
One-digit industry and occupation No Yes No Yes
included
Log-likelihood -892.1 -876.2 -781.4 -764.0
a. There are 5,968 observations in Panel A, and 1,740 observations in Panel B. Other types of discrimination
include discrimination based on race, religion, and nationality. Additional control variables are the same as in
columns 5 and 6 of Tables 2 and 3. See footnotes to Table 2 for details.Table 7
Logit Estimates of Job Separations and Employment Status, 1966-1980,
Distinguishing Basis for Age Discrimination Reports,
Among Workers Who Initially Report No Discrimination’
Job Se~arations
(1) (2)
Reports age discrimination not related
to hiring or interviewing
(N=31O)
Reports not hired or interviewed
because of age (N = 37)
Health limits work
Subject to mandatory retirement,
age < 55
Subject to mandatory retirement,
55 c age s 65
Subject to mandatory retirement,
age >65
Covered by pension in 1966
















































































































a. The sample is restricted to individuals who report no discrimination in 1971. A handful of observations with missing
occupation and industry data are deleted in order to achieve convergence. There are 5,728 observations. Additional control
variables in columns 1 and 3 are the same as in column 5 of Tables 2 and 3. Additional control variables in columns 2 and 4 are
the same as in column 6 of Tables 2 and 3. See footnotes to Table 2 for additional details.Table 8
Logit Estimates of Job Separations and Employment Status, 1973-1980,
Among Workers With Only One Employer Per Reporting Period
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each of the periods 1973-1976 and 1978-1980. There are 5,007 observations. Additional control variables in columns 1 and 3 are
. .
the same as in column 5 of Tables 2 and 3. Additional control variables in columns 2 and 4 are the same as in column 6 of Tables
2 and 3. See footnotes to Table 2 for additional details.Table 9
Logit Estimates of Labor Force Status, 1973-1980
Among Workers Who Initially Report No Discrimination
Not Employed, Not Not Employed
Retired Looking for Work for Two Periods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reports age discrimination -.05 -.02 .07 .12 .14 .19
(.16) (.16) (.14) (.15) (.15) (.15)
[0.95] [0.98] [1.08] [1.13] [1.15] [1.21]
Predicted log wage included Yes No Yes No Yes No
One-digit industry and No Yes No Yes No Yes
occupation included
Log-likelihood -2310.2 -2109.1 -2384.7 -2358.3 -2335.1 -2307.2
a. The sample is restricted to individuals who report no discrimination in 1971, A handfil of observations with missing
occupation and industry data are deleted in order to achieve convergence. There are 5,728 observations. Additional control
variables in columns 1, 3, and 5 are the same as in column 5 of Tables 2 and 3. Additional control variables in columns 2, 4, and 6
are the same as in column 6 of Tables 2 and 3. See footnotes to Table 2 for additional details.
b. The dependent variable equals one if respondent reports retirement as his major activity during subsequent interview, zero
otherwise.
c. The dependent variable equals one if respondent does not report working or looking for work at subsequent interview, zero
otherwise.
d. The dependent variable equals one if respondent is not employed at either of the two subsequent interviews, zero otherwise.Table 10
Effects of Age Discrimination on Wage Changes
(OLS estimates, with standard errors in parentheses)
Reports age discrimination
Reports age discrimination and
separates from employer
Reports age discrimination and does
not separate from employer
Reports age discrimination and
experiences spell of non-employment
Reports age discrimination and does












Adjusted R’ .02 .02 .02
a. The dependent variable is the change in the real log wage. Changes in disability, marital status,
age, age squared, and SMSA residence are also included in the specification. N = 10,096.